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1. Introduction  
 
 
Utilitarianism, it is often said, is not sensitive to the distribution of welfare across different 
individuals’.1 In a risk-free environment, what this means is that utilitarianism is indifferent 
whether an increment in welfare of a given size goes to a better-off or a less well-off person, 
and it requires an intervention that procures even a slightly greater increase in welfare to the 
better off at the cost of a smaller decrease in welfare to the worse off.  
 
One can construe this as a kind of dilemma. On the one hand, the utilitarian has a reasonable 
objective, that is, to maximise total or average welfare in society. On the other hand, the 
sensitivity of their opponent is reasonable as well: The worse off should not be expected to 
incur losses for the sake of just marginally larger gains to the better off. Different decision-
makers will resolve this dilemma in different ways depending on how sensitive they are to 
the distribution of welfare.  
 
In the presence of risk, the matter is much more complex than in a risk-free environment 
because there are more distributions in play that elicit distinct sensitivities. These sensitivities 
will generate different types of dilemmas.  
 
In section 2, I will present four dilemmas that all involve risk in decision-making for others. 
These dilemmas seem quite disparate. In section 3, I construct a model that captures four 
distinct distributional sensitivities that a decision-maker might have when making risky 
decisions for others. The model specifies four parameters that quantify the strength of these 
sensitivities. In section 4, I will show how each of the four dilemmas occurs because a 
particular distributional sensitivity kicks in and pulls us away from what the utilitarian would 
prescribe in the context of decision-making under risk. In section 5, I will turn to the much-
discussed case of Saving the Few at Greater Risk to the Many. This case is more complex, 
because there are two distributional sensitivities at work that pull in opposite directions from 
the utilitarian calculus. Finally, in section 6, I will consider objections to each of the four 
distributional sensitivities. Section 7 reflects on the role of formal modelling by means of 
prospects.  
 
 
 
2. Four Dilemmas  
                                               
1 For example, see Gauthier 1963: 121–7, Rawls 1974–75, Sen 1973, and Williams 1973.  
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2.1 Restrictive Intervention  
 
Suppose that we have a cheap but less effective drug that we can provide to all, or an 
expensive but more effective drug that, due to budgetary constraints, we can provide only to 
half the population. The catch is that the expected number of lives saved by the more 
expensive drug programme, even if only provided to half, is greater than the expected 
number of lives saved by the cheaper drug programme, provided to all. Should we procure 
the cheaper drug to all or the more expensive drug to half?  
 
Ubel et al. 1996 construct a case in which the allocation of the expensive drug is conducted 
by randomisation. They polled decision theorists, prospective jurors and medical ethicists 
asking whether we should procure the cheaper drug to all or the more expensive drug to half. 
This case constitutes a dilemma with forces pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
one wants to maximise the expected number of people saved. This favours the more 
expensive drug. On the other hand, once the randomisation device has determined who will 
get the more expensive drug, people have unequal chances of survival. This favours the 
cheaper drug. Indeed, Ubel et al. find that decision theorists tend to favour the more 
expensive drug for half, while prospective jurors and medical ethicists tend to favour the 
cheaper drug for all.  
 
 
2.2 Diversification   
 
The GiveWell website, run by Effective Altruists, recommends charities that provide the 
greatest expected reduction in suffering and premature death for each marginal dollar 
contributed. Organisations that do extremely well, according to this calculus, are anti-malaria 
and deworming initiatives.  
 
Critics ask why GiveWell’s calculus is not more favourable to otherwise highly-regarded 
charities like Oxfam, MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières) and the Red Cross. The response from 
Effective Altruists is that they respect these organisations, but that organisations that support 
diverse causes do worse in their calculus than organisations that support single causes. One 
reason for this is that a diversified portfolio tends to include causes with effects that are hard 
to measure, such as advocacy against corruption.  
 
However, there is another difference between single-cause and multiple-cause organisations. 
For single-cause organisations, the chances that your marginal dollar will do some good are 
more correlated than for multiple-cause organisations.  
 
Consider deworming initiatives. These initiatives support massive deworming in schools in 
the developing world. The pupils are not tested individually, since treatment is cheaper than 
testing and the pills are relatively safe. The original study by Miguel and Kremer 2003 
suggested that deworming has huge educational impacts (which hold the promise of future 
economic benefits). Taylor-Robinson et al. 2015, Aiken et al. 2015, and Davey et al. 2015 cast 
doubt on these results. However, GiveWell continues to support the initiatives, because they 
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are cost effective. Deworming is cheap and it just might have a huge impact. However, a 
blogger on the GiveWell website also admits that it “might have close to zero impact” (Sean 
2017).   
 
Granted, deworming may not work equally well in all places, but one would expect that the 
success or failure of these interventions around the developing world is at least to some 
extent correlated. Hence, in giving to deworming initiatives, there is a non-negligible chance 
that one’s donations will have little or no impact. By contrast, contributions to organisations 
like Oxfam go to a broad array of causes. The expected reduction in suffering and premature 
death from donations may be lower than from deworming initiatives, but at least a portion 
of one’s donation is likely to do some good.  
 
The dilemma is this: Should we make charitable donations to single-cause organisations in 
order to maximise the expected benefits, even if there is a good chance that the money will 
be money down the drain? Or, should we donate to multiple-cause organisations in order to 
make sure that our donations will at least do some good in the world, even if the expected 
benefits of our donations are lower?  
 
 
2.3 Unwelcome Risk Reductions 
  
 
Spiegelhalter 2015 has constructed a flow graph that offers a visual representation of the 
costs and benefits of breast cancer screening in the UK. The graph shows that 7.5% of women 
between 50 and 70 in the UK have symptoms of breast cancer that would be discovered by 
screening. If they are screened, then all 7.5% will be treated, 6% will survive and 1.5% will die. 
If they are not screened, then 1.5% will have symptoms that would be discovered in screening, 
but they will never become aware of it: They will remain undiagnosed, untreated and the 
disease will never bother them. In other words, if they had been screened, this 1.5% would 
have been needlessly treated. The remaining 6% will eventually show symptoms and be 
treated; 4% will survive and 2% will die.  
 
So, screening reduces the chance of mortality with 2% – 1.5% = .5%. But it comes at a cost of 
1.5% who are needlessly treated. If that 1.5% would not have been screened, they would have 
never known that they had symptoms of breast cancer.  
 
Many women opt against screening when told about these stats. A mere .5% reduction in 
mortality does not justify the hassle for them. There is the annoyance of the screening, the 
needless agony of false positives, and the 1.5% of treatments that are unnecessary. And yet, 
screening does save about 1300 lives per year in the UK.  
 
This is our dilemma. On the one hand, it seems that we should respect the wishes of fully 
informed patients. On the other hand, there is a compelling case to be made that, taking into 
account costs, saving an expected 1300 lives merits the implementation of a screening 
process. 
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2.4 Not on My Watch   
 
Johnson and Rehavi 2016 present a study of the percentage of deliveries by C-sections for 
prospective mothers who are themselves MDs versus for prospective mothers who are not 
MDs. They find that the percentage of unscheduled C-sections—that is after a vaginal birth 
was attempted—is higher for prospective mothers who are not MDs.  
 
Why is this the case? It may be the case that some obstetricians need to make their car 
payments by the end of the month and perform needless C-sections. C-sections are more 
lucrative than vaginal births and under conditions of asymmetry of information, financial 
incentives create physician induced demand for C-sections. However, they can’t pull this off 
on prospective mothers who are MDs, since those patients know better. One datum in 
support of this hypothesis is that we also find a lower rate of C-sections on partners of 
prospective fathers who are MDs and that the rate of C-sections is even lower when we focus 
on prospective mothers who are obstetricians.  The results do not hold for scheduled C-
sections, i.e., C-sections that were planned beforehand. The authors suggest that this is the 
case because there are strict criteria for scheduled C-sections.  
 
Another explanation is that the obstetricians are afraid of being sued by the women or their 
families for not proceeding with a C-section during somewhat difficult or risky deliveries. They 
may trust that prospective mothers or partners of prospective fathers who are themselves 
MDs are less likely to file suit against a fellow doctor for medical malpractice.  
 
However, let us try to be less cynical and attempt a friendlier explanation. When there are 
concerns during the birthing process, proceeding to a C-section is often the less risky option. 
Vaginal birth can result in success (a healthy mother and foetus) or failure (death or injury to 
the mother or foetus). Due to the longer recovery period, the outcome of a C-section typically 
ranks between an outcome of success and an outcome of failure of a vaginal birth.   
 
If the prospective mother is not an MD, then the obstetrician takes the decision for the 
prospective mother. Even if holding out for a vaginal birth is a risk that the obstetrician 
themselves would want to take if they were in the position of the prospective mother, they 
may not want to take this risk for the prospective mother. Hence, they proceed to a C-section 
more swiftly.  
 
To defend this decision, they may say: “I can’t have death or injury due to forgoing a C-section 
happen on my watch.” And this is not (just) because they are concerned about their 
reputation or about being sued. Rather, a good person finds it harder to take a loss when 
gambling with the welfare of others, than with the welfare of themselves. This is why they 
might want to take the gamble when watching over themselves, but not when watching over 
others.  
 
If the prospective mother is herself an MD, then the obstetrician is more like a fiduciary care-
taker. They simply adopt the risk attitudes of the MD prospective mother. The obstetrician 
doesn’t take the decision for her – rather they see themselves as executing the decision that 
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the prospective mother would take for herself. Hence, they are less swift in proceeding to a 
C-section.2 
 
The dilemma can then be phrased as follows. The presumption is that non-MD prospective 
mothers, if they were fully informed, would have risk attitudes that are no different from MD 
prospective mothers. Should an obstetrician respect the risk attitudes that the non-MD 
prospective mother would have if she were fully informed? Or, is it permissible for the 
obstetrician to import additional risk aversion over and above the risk attitudes of the non-
MD prospective mother? 
 
 
 
3. Distributional Sensitivities 
 
 
I will construct a model to cast light on where the pull comes from in each of these dilemmas.  
 
3.1 Four Distributional Sensitivities  
 
Suppose that you were asked to make a choice between prospects Risky and Certain in Tables 
1 and 2 that will affect two people. A matrix represents a prospect, rows represent personal 
prospects, columns represent states (of the world). There is a probability distribution defined 
over the states and the entries in the matrix are utility values.   
 
                                               
2 Granted, one problem with this explanation is that the difference in C-section rates 
performed on non-MDs versus MDs disappears when we restrict ourselves to HMO hospitals 
in which obstetricians get a fixed salary and don’t work on a fee-for-service basis. This favours 
the hypothesis of physician-induced demand driven by financial incentives.  
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Expected Utility  
(EU)  
 S1  
Prob(S1) = .3 
S2  
Prob(S1) = .7  
6.7 Person 1  20 1 
3.4  Person 2  2  4 
Average EU  
Expectation of SA  
5.05  
State Average (SA) 11  2.5 
 
Table 1. Risky  
 
Expected Utility   S  
Prob(S) = 1 
5 Person 1  5 
5  Person 2  5  
Average EU  
Expectation of SA  
5 
State Average (SA) 5 
 
Table 2. Certain  
 
We can calculate the value of the prospect ex ante, that is, by computing the average of the 
expected utilities. Or, we can calculate the value of the prospect ex post, that is, by computing 
the expectation of the average utility in each state. By simple algebra, the average of the 
expectations equals the expectation of the state averages.  
 
Harsanyi 1955 imposes a set of requirements of minimal rationality on the ranking of 
prospects and shows, in his aggregation theorem, that we should rank prospects relative to 
the weighted average of the expectations in the prospect. If we add to this a requirement of 
anonymity—that is, the identity of the people does not matter—then we are required to 
order prospects relative to the average of the expectations of the persons in the prospect. 
Hence, following Harsanyi, we should rank Risky over Certain.  
 
But forget about theory for a second. Suppose that a decision-maker is entrusted with making 
a decision between these two prospects. I submit that many decision-makers would want to 
play it safe and choose Certain over Risky. What might such a decision-maker say if they were 
asked to give a justification for their decision? They might mention a number of things that 
they dislike about Risky:  
 
(i) They may dislike the fact that person 2’s expectation is substantially lower than 
person 1’s.   
(ii) They may dislike the fact that state S2, which is likely to materialise, has a low 
average utility.  
(iii) They may dislike the fact that whatever state materialises, there will be 
inequality between the persons.  
(iv) They may dislike taking the risk of receiving a low outcome on behalf of person 
1 if S2 materialises or a low outcome on behalf of person 2 if S1 materialises.    
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The decision-maker finds fault with four types of distributions: In (i), they find fault with the 
inter-personal prospect distribution. This is the distribution of the expected utilities, viz. <6.7, 
3.4>. In (ii), they find fault with the inter-state distribution. This is the distribution of the state 
averages, viz. <11, 2.5>. In (iii), they find fault with the intra-state distributions. There are two 
intra-state distributions, viz. <20, 2> and <1, 4>. In (iv), they find fault with the intra-personal 
prospect distributions. There are two intra-personal prospect distributions, viz. <20, 1> and 
<2, 4>.  
 
The decision-maker resists the recommendation of the prospect with the greatest average 
expectation or the greatest expectation of averages by pointing to four worrisome 
distributional features. They are sensitive to spread, that is, they would rather see less than 
more spread in these distributions and this is what motivates the decision-maker to 
recommend B over A. For simplicity, let us name the average of the expectations or the 
expectation of the state averages the utilitarian value of the prospect, though the import of 
Harsanyi’s Theorem is open to interpretation (see Weymark 1991 and Greaves 2017). Hence, 
the utilitarian value of Risky may exceed the utilitarian value of Certain and yet, we would 
prefer Certain over Risky on distributional grounds.  
 
 
3.2 Modelling Distributional Sensitivities 
 
I will import these distributional sensitivities in the determination of the value of a prospect.  
 
 
3.2.1 The Inter-Personal Prospect Distribution 
 
 
Suppose that we are sensitive to the inter-personal prospect distribution. Let us take some 
simple numbers. Suppose that person 1 has an expectation of 16 and person 2 has an 
expectation of 4, so that the utilitarian value of the prospect is 10.  
 
A decision-maker who would rather see less of a spread in the distribution of expected utility 
might say: “This prospect has the same value to me as a prospect in which each were to have 
the same expectation—an expectation that is lower than 10 and greater than or equal to 4.” 
If they are slightly sensitive to the spread in the distribution, then this expectation will be a 
number closer to 10. If they are more sensitive, then this expectation will be a number closer 
to 4.  
 
What we need is a function with a single parameter ∝ so that, as ∝ moves from 0 to +∞, the 
value of the distribution moves from 10 to 4. The following function does precisely this.3 For 
i = 1, … ,  n persons, let xi  be the expectation of person i and, to respect anonymity, let us set 
the person-weights wi = 1/n.   
                                               
3 The function is in Atkinson 1970: 249-52 and is applied to prospects in Fleurbaey 2010: 658. 
This function is not rank-order sensitive. Alternatively, we can use a rank-order sensitive 
function as described in Donaldson and Weymark 1980: 74. See Bovens 2015a.   
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(1) $∑ 𝑤'𝑥'(*+,).'/* 0* (*+,)1   for ∝	≠ 1 
 
 exp(∑ 𝑤' ln 𝑥').'/*    for ∝	= 1 
 
This function yields the equally distributed equivalent of the distribution.  
 
To illustrate, set ∝ at the intermediate value of ½. Then in our example,  
 
(2) :1/2√16 + 1/2√4AB= 9  
 
Since we apply the function to expectations here, it yields the equally-distributed equivalent 
of the expectations (EDEE) for a decision-maker with the inter-personal prospect distribution-
sensitivity ∝CDCC . So, we could say that the inter-personal prospective distribution-sensitive 
value of the prospect is not 10, but rather 9 for a decision-maker characterised by the 
sensitivity parameter ∝CDCC  = 1/2.  
 
Returning to our prospects Risky and Certain in Tables 1 and 2, the utilitarian value of the 
prospects is the average of the expectations, or, in other words, the equally distributed 
equivalent of the expectations with ∝CDCC  = 0. Hence Risky ranks higher than Certain on the 
utilitarian calculus. However, the inter-personal prospect distribution-sensitive value with ∝CDCC  = 1/2 of the prospects is:  
 (3)		𝑉,GHGG	/*/B(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦) = :1/2√6.7 + 1/2√3.4AB = 4.91… < 	5 = 	𝑉,GHGG/*/B(𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)	 
 
Hence, a decision-maker with this type of sensitivity would choose Certain over Risky.  
 
This is one distributional sensitivity. The decision-maker may bring other distributional 
sensitivities to the evaluation of the prospects. We will treat each of these distributional 
sensitivities in the same formal manner.   
 
 
3.2.2 The Inter-State Distribution  
 
Consider the inter-state distribution sensitivity. Suppose that there are two equiprobable 
states with average utilities 16 and 4. Then we could do the same exercise. The utilitarian is 
not sensitive to this distribution and the value of the prospect is just the expectation of the 
state averages, viz. 10. A decision-maker who is slightly sensitive to the inter-state distribution 
would consider the value of the prospect to be lower than but closer to 10, whereas a 
decision-maker who is very sensitive to the inter-state distribution would consider the value 
of the prospect to be closer to 4. The following function permits us to model inter-state 
sensitivities with xj being state averages for states j = 1, …, m and 𝛽	ranging from 0 to +∞.  
 
(4)  	$∑ 𝑝\𝑥\(*+])\^/* 0* (*+])1  for 𝛽	 ≠ 1 
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 exp(∑ 𝑝\ ln 𝑥\)\^/*    for 𝛽	 = 1 
 
This function yields the certainty equivalent of the distribution.  
 
For 𝛽 equals ½, the value of the prospect with averages 16 and 4 in equiprobable states equals 
9. Since we apply the function to state averages, it yields the certainty equivalent of the 
averages (CEA) for a person with inter-state sensitivity 𝛽_C`= ½.  
 
Returning to our prospects Risky and Certain, the inter-state distribution-sensitive value of 
the prospects is: 
 
(5)  𝑉]aGb/*/B(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦) = :. 3√11 + .7√2.5AB = 4.42… < 	5 = 	𝑉]aGb/*/B(𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)	 
 
So, the decision-maker with this type of sensitivity would choose Certain over Risky.  
 
 
3.2.3 The Intra-State Distribution 
 
Suppose that the decision-maker is sensitive to the intra-state distribution. In this case, they 
will calculate the equally-distributed equivalent (EDE) of each state and set the value of the 
prospect at the expectation of the EDEs. Again, let us set ∝CDC  = 1/2.  In our example:  
 
(6)  𝑉,GHG/*/B(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦) = .3:1/2√20 + 1/2√2AB +	 .7:1/2√1 + 1/2√4AB = 4.17	 
 
which is smaller than 𝑉,GHG/*/B(𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛) = 5.  
 
 
3.2.4 The Intra-Personal Prospect Distribution 
 
Finally, suppose that the decision-maker is sensitive to the intra-personal prospect 
distribution. Then they will calculate the certainty-equivalents (CE) for each person and set 
the value of the prospect at the average of the CEs. In our example with 𝛽_C  = 1/2:  
 
(5) 𝑉]aG/*/B(𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛) = 1/2:.3√20 + .7√1AB + 	1/2:. 3√2 + .7√4AB = 3.75	 
 
which is smaller than 𝑉]aG/*/B(𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦) = 5.  
 
Table 3 provides an overview.  
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Distributional 
Sensitivity  
Value of the Prospect  Parameter 
Inter-Personal 
Prospect  
Equally Distributed Equivalent of the 
Personal Prospect Expectations  
∝CDCC  
Inter-State  Certainty Equivalent of the State 
Averages  
𝛽_C`  
Intra-State  Expectation of the Equally Distributed 
Equivalents of the States  
∝CDC  
Intra-Personal 
Prospect  
Average of the Certainty Equivalents of 
the Personal Prospects  
𝛽_C  
 
Table 3. Distributional Sensitivities, Prospect Values, and Parameters 
 
 
 
4 Revisiting the Dilemmas  
 
I will now revisit each of the dilemmas of Section 2. I will construct a stylised model for each 
dilemma and show how the distributional sensitivities underlie these dilemmas.  
 
 
4.1 Sensitivity to the Inter-Personal Prospect Distribution and Restrictive Intervention  
 
We model the case in which the people have been allocated to the groups that will and will 
not receive the more expensive drug. Suppose that without any intervention, there is a .70 
survival rate. A cheaper intervention provided to all can increase the survival rate to .80. A 
more expensive intervention provided to half the population can increase the survival rate to 
.90 + 𝜀. Let us first model the allocation without randomisation. For example, we might 
stipulate that the more expensive drug is provided to the urban population, but not to the 
equally large rural population.  
 
 
EU  
.90 
+ 𝜺 0 1 1 1 … 
… … … …  … 
.70 0 0 0 1 … 
… … … … … … 
 
 
 ≻ghij  
 ≺i.lmnoo 
 
EU 
.80 0 1 1 … 
… … … … … 
… … … … … 
… … … … … 
.80 1 1 0 … 
 
Restrictive Intervention     Intervention for All 
 
Table 4. Restrictive Intervention and Intervention for All  
 
A utilitarian decision-maker prefers Restrictive Intervention to Intervention for All.  
 
(8) 𝑉ghij(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = .80 + 𝜀 2⁄ > 	 .80 = 𝑉ghij(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙) 
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But now suppose that the decision-maker is sensitive to the inter-personal prospect 
distribution. For sufficiently large values of ∝CDCC  and sufficiently small values of 𝜀, the value 
Intervention for All exceeds the value of Restrictive Intervention and hence they will prefer 
Intervention for All. 
 
(9) 𝑉,GHGG	/	y	z	{	(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) < 	𝑉	,GHGG	/	y	z	{(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑙𝑙)	 
 
In Ubel et al. 1996, the allocation is done by randomisation. The argument above still applies 
if we focus on the time-point after the randomisation has taken place. One might say that the 
medical ethicists and the prospective jurors, who favour Intervention for All, focus on the 
post-randomisation point when the persons in the prospect face unequal expectations in 
their personal prospects and are sensitive to the inter-personal prospect distribution. The 
decision theorists do not have this sensitivity and follow the utilitarian calculus.  
 
The decision theorists could object that in case of randomisation, Restrictive Intervention is 
really the only reasonable solution. If we focus on the time point before the randomisation 
took place, each person’s expectation from this programme is both (i) equal and (ii) greater 
than each person’s expectation from the programme providing the cheaper drug to the whole 
population. Hence, the expensive drug should win out and sensitivity to the inter-personal 
prospect distribution cannot undo this.  
 
The medical ethicists and prospective jurors could retort: Why should the preferred reference 
point be the pre-randomisation point? The decision theorist could respond that participants 
would have consented if they had been asked before the randomisation. But the fact of the 
matter is that they were not asked and why should hypothetical consent qualify as a 
justification? Someone who favours Intervention for All because they take the post-
randomisation inequality to be morally relevant is not making a mistake or is not being 
irrational.  
 
 
4.2 Sensitivity to the Inter-State Distribution and Diversification  
 
Imagine a population in desperate need of a charity intervention. In the model, the outcome 
of a failed intervention is assigned the value 0 (e.g., for death) and the outcome of a successful 
outcome is assigned the value 1 (e.g., for full health). GiveWell recommends charities that are 
single cause and have a reasonable chance of success. The chance that the intervention is 
successful is, say, 2/3 +	𝜀. If the intervention is successful, then it is successful for all. Oxfam 
supports multiple causes. These interventions offer slightly less of a chance of success to each 
person—say, a chance of 2/3. But they are sufficiently varied so that they won’t all fail 
together. Multiple-Cause in Table 5 is represented as anti-correlated risk. (Here and in the 
tables below I represent prospects with anti-correlated risk rather than with independent risk. 
I do so for simplicity of presentation, because the contrast I wish to draw holds equally will 
for anti-correlated risk as for independent risk.)  
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EU P(S1) =  
1/3 -	𝜺 P(S2) =  2/3 +	𝜺 
2/3 + 𝜺 0 1 1 
2/3 +	𝜺 0 1 1 
2/3 +	𝜺 0 1 1 
SA 0 1 1 
 
 
 
 ≻ghij  
 ≺i.lmn|l}lm  
 
EU P(S1) = 
1/3 
P(S2) = 
1/3 
P(S3) = 
1/3 
2/3  0 1 1 
2/3 1 0 1 
2/3  1 1 0 
SA 2/3 2/3 2/3 
 
Single-Cause  Multiple-Cause  
 
Table 5. Single-Cause and Multiple-Cause  
 
A utilitarian decision-maker prefers Single-Cause over Multiple-Cause:  
 
(10) 𝑉ghij(𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒) = 2 3⁄ + 	𝜀 > 2 3⁄ = 	𝑉ghij(𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒) 
 
The decision-maker who favours Multiple-Cause deviates from the utilitarian 
recommendation by adopting a sensitivity to the inter-state distribution. For a sufficiently 
large value of the parameter 𝛽_C`	and a sufficiently small 𝜀, 
 
(11) 𝑉]aGb	/	y	z	{	(𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒) < 	𝑉]aGb	/	y	z	{(𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒)	 
 
They look at the state averages and are reluctant to support a single-cause charity that has a 
reasonable chance of being good for nothing. Deworming projects may have great value on 
the utilitarian calculus, but if the research on deworming does not bear out, as has been 
suggested in follow-up studies, then all the donations are money down the drain. The 
utilitarian value of single-cause charities may be greater, but the certainty equivalent of the 
state averages is greater for multiple-cause charities than for single-cause charities. In other 
words, they would rather play the short odds of Oxfam or MSF than the long odds of 
Deworming initiatives, even though the expected value of the latter is greater than of the 
former.  
 
 
4.3 Sensitivity to the Intra-State Distribution and Unwelcome Risk Reductions  
 
Let us construct a stylised model of the breast cancer screening case that uses different 
numbers than in Spiegelhalter’s flow graph, but still captures the dilemma associated with 
screening for breast cancer in public health. Suppose that without screenings, the chances of 
survival are 2/3 and risks are independent. With screenings, there are no cancer fatalities. 
However, there are still costs to screenings: the mere imposition, the false positives and the 
unnecessary surgeries. We set the utility of screening at 2/3 – 𝜀, so that each woman would 
opt for No Screening over Screening.  
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EU 
2/3 - 𝜺 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 - 𝜀 
2/3 - 𝜺 2/3 - 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 - 𝜀 
2/3 - 𝜺 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 - 𝜀 
 
No Screening  Screening  
 
Table 6. No Screening and Screening  
 
A utilitarian decision-maker who is insensitive to the intra-state distribution prefers No 
Screening to Screening.  
 
(12) 𝑉ghij(𝑁𝑜𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) > 	𝑉ghij(𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
 
However, a decision-maker who is sensitive to the intra-state distribution dislikes the fact 
that, under No Screening, there is a wide spread in the utilities within each state. If the equally 
distributed equivalent of each state in No Screening drops below 2/3 – 𝜀, then the value of 
the prospect No Screening will be lower than the value of the prospect Screening. This will 
indeed be the case for sufficiently large 𝛼CDC  and sufficiently small 𝜀.  
 
(13) 𝑉,GHG	/	y	z	{(𝑁𝑜𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) < 	𝑉,GHG	/	y	z	{(𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
 
So, a decision-maker with a sensitivity for the intra-state distributions will overrule the 
preference of the women affected. To justify their decision, they will point to the fact that 
there is bound to be a large casualty rate within each state.4 
 
 
4.4 Sensitivity to the Intra-Personal Prospect Distribution and Not on My Watch   
 
Suppose that, given certain obstetric indications, an obstetrician must choose between 
vaginal birth, at the risk of the life of the mother and the foetus, or a C-section, which is safer 
but requires a longer recovery process. We model the stage at which a fully informed 
prospective mother would decline a C-section, but just barely; with a slight increase in the 
risk of harm to her or the foetus, the mother would opt for a C-section. For example, suppose 
that the mother has a 2/3 chance of the best outcome (say a successful vaginal birth) at utility 
1 and a 1/3 chance of the worst outcome (say, death) at utility 0. If the mother chooses a C-
section, she is certain to end up with utility 2/3 – 𝜀.  
 
Given that this concerns a pattern of decisions followed by obstetricians, we imagine that 
multiple women are in this situation.  
                                               
4 A similar case and analysis is presented in Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve 2013.  
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EU 
2/3 – 𝜺 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 
2/3 – 𝜺 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 
2/3 – 𝜺 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 2/3 – 𝜀 
 
Vaginal Birth      C-section  
 
Table 7. Vaginal Birth and C-Section  
 
Since the expectation of vaginal birth is greater than of C-section, the affected prospective 
mothers will choose for a vaginal birth. If the prospective mother is herself an MD, then the 
obstetrician will simply exercise fiduciary care and execute her will.  
 
(14) 𝑉ghij(𝑉𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ) 	> 	𝑉ghij	(𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
If the prospective mother is not an MD, then the obstetrician will be deciding for her. Now 
suppose that the obstetrician is sensitive to the intra-personal prospect distribution. For a 
sufficiently large value of the parameter 𝛽_C  and a sufficiently small 𝜀,  
 
(15) 𝑉]aG	/	y	z	{	(𝑉𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ) < 	𝑉]aG	/	y	z	{(𝐶𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)	 
 
When deciding for non-MD prospective mothers, they are deciding for others. Even though it 
may be reasonable for the prospective mother herself to take the risk of a vaginal birth, the 
obstetrician wishes to play it safe. In this case, playing it safe is playing it a bit safer than a 
reasonable and fully informed prospective mother would choose to play it herself. This can 
be modelled by assigning a value greater than 0 to the certainty equivalent parameter 𝛽_C , 
measuring the decision-maker’s sensitivity to the intra-personal prospect distribution.5  
 
 
4.5 Summing Up  
 
The first four dilemmas nicely map onto our four distributional sensitivities. The following 
table provides an overview. 
  
                                               
5 Lara Buchak 2017: 22–24 argues that in making risky decisions for others when not knowing 
their risk attitude, we should operate with the most risk averse attitude within the range of 
what is reasonable, but if we know their risk attitude we should operate with their risk 
attitude. This could provide an alternative explanation. Since the obstetrician and the MD 
prospective mother have the same medical background, the obstetrician may be presumed 
to be more knowledgeable of the MD prospective mother’s risk attitude. If the prospective 
mother is not an MD, then the obstetrician is less knowledgeable and decides for her with a 
more risk averse attitude.  
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Dilemma  Sensitivity for 
Distribution 
Value of the Prospect 
Restrictive Intervention  Inter-Personal Prospect Equally Distributed Equivalent 
of the Personal-Prospect 
Expectations 
Diversification  Inter-State Certainty Equivalent of the State 
Averages  
Unwelcome Risk Reductions Intra-State Expectation of the State Equally 
Distributed Equivalents 
Not on My Watch  Intra-Personal Prospect Average of the Personal-
Prospect Certainty Equivalents  
 
Table 8. Overview  
 
In each dilemma, it is a particular sensitivity that provides a counter weight to the utilitarian 
recommendation. Someone who has this sensitivity will reasonably substitute the value of 
the prospect in the table for the utilitarian value of the prospect.  
 
We now move on to the dilemma of Saving Few at Greater Risk to Many which is slightly more 
complex because it incorporates multiple distributional sensitivities.  
 
 
 
5 Saving Few at Greater Risk to Many    
 
 
5.1 Cases   
 
Here are five cases of in which we must choose between saving the few or reducing the risk 
to the many.    
 
(i) We can either provide expensive anti-retrovirals to AIDS patients or increase 
efforts to prevent HIV transmission (e.g., through condom dispersal 
programmes). 
(ii) We can either treat those infected with Ebola or we can invest in prevention 
through vaccination projects. 
(iii) We can either invest millions on saving a miner who is trapped or direct the 
funds to improving mine safety so as to prevent future accidents.  
(iv) In the biblical Parable of the Lost Sheep (Luke 15: 3–7) we can go out and save 
one sheep while leaving the 99 sheep in the barn at the risk of a visit by 
wolves.6 
                                               
6 Luke 15 is a response to the Pharisees who object that Jesus keeps the company of sinners 
and tax collectors. Jesus responds that there is more joy in saving people who have gone 
astray than in attending to the righteous. My interpretation may be a bit of a stretch as biblical 
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(v) Diesel engines emit more NOx and particulates. This imposes risk on present 
people who suffer from respiratory diseases. Fuel engines emit more CO2 and 
impose risks on future people due to climate change and these risks will affect 
many. We can protect the present few by policies favourable to fuel engines, 
or we can reduce the risk to the future many by policies favourable to diesel 
engines.  
 
There is a question as to whether the many are facing more or less correlated risk. The stories 
can be filled in in different ways. For some diseases that we fail to prevent, the risks to the 
many are independent. For other diseases, the risks are correlated; that is, there is the risk of 
an outbreak. Investment in mine safety may address more or less correlated risk. Depending 
on the hunting behaviour of the wolves, the risk to the sheep in the barn may me more or 
less correlated. In the case of climate change risks are clearly correlated.   
 
All of these cases have the structure of a dilemma. In the case of independent risk, the pull 
comes from two directions. We want to save the most expected lives, yet it seems heartless 
not to save the few. In the case of correlated risk, there is an additional pull from a third 
direction, viz. we are wary of catastrophes in which things go wrong for the many.7  
 
 
5.2 Modelling Saving Few at Greater Independent Risk to Many   
 
Suppose that person n is sure to die unless we save them. If we forego saving them, then we 
can increase the survival chance for persons 1, …, n – 1 from .95 to .95 + 𝜀. Let us assume that 
these survival chances are independent. Under Treatment, resources are being allocated to 
person n who will now survive whereas otherwise they were sure to die. Under Prevention, 
we let person n die, but we reduce the risk to persons 1 through n – 1 who now face a better 
prospect. Suppose that (n – 1)𝜀 > 1 so that the utilitarian decision-maker prefers Prevention 
to Treatment.  
                                               
scholarship goes, but one could say that the cost of saving a few sinners is that one cannot 
give due attention to the righteous who are thereby put at increased risk of sinning.    
7 The problem of saving few at the cost of a greater risk to many is discussed by Schelling 
1968, Reibetanz 1998, Brock and Wikler 2009, Otsuka 2015, and Frick 2015. The Lost Sheep 
case is discussed in Bovens and Fleurbaey 2012 and Dieselgate is discussed in Bovens 2017.  
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EU 
.95 0 1 1 … 
 1 0 1 … 
…  … … … … 
.95 1 1 0 … 
1 1 1 1 … 
 
Prevention    Treatment  
 
Table 9. Prevention and Treatment  
 
However, if a decision-maker is sensitive to the distribution of the expectations (i.e. if they 
are sensitive to the inter-personal prospect distribution), then they will prefer Treatment to 
Prevention.  
 
Formally, for the utilitarian decision-maker the value of the prospects is such that:  
 
(16)  𝑉ghij(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) > 	𝑉ghij(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
 
However, for sufficiently large 𝛼CDCC  and sufficiently small n and 𝜀, the value of the prospects 
is such that:  
 
(17) 𝑉,GHGG	/	y	z	{(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) > 	𝑉,GHGG	/	y	z	{(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
Exactly the same reasoning applies here as in the case of Restrictive Intervention, discussed 
in Section 4.1.  
 
 
5.3 Modelling Saving Few at Greater Correlated Risk to Many   
 
Let us fill in the story of the Lost Sheep as a case of correlated risk. We call the action of saving 
the one sheep “Saving One Sheep” and attending to the sheep in the barn “Protecting 99 
Sheep”. Saving One Sheep saves the lost sheep on row 100, but at the expense of leaving the 
sheep on rows 1 through 99 and subjecting them to the risk of a visit from a pack of wolves. 
Protecting 99 Sheep gives up on the sheep on row 100 but makes sure that the sheep on rows 
1 through 99 are properly protected.  
 
18 
 
 
 
EU 
1 1 1 1 
… … … … 
1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
SA .99 … .99 
 
 
 ≻i.lmn|l}lm  
 ≺i.lmnoo 
 
 
EU 
.989… 1 … 1 0 
… … … … … 
.989… 1 … 1 0 
1 1 … 1 1 
SA 1 … 1 .01 
 
Protecting 99 Sheep  Saving One Sheep 
 
Table 10. Protecting 99 Sheep and Saving One Sheep  
 
If the survival chances of the 99 sheep in the barn are (99 – 1)/99 = .989…, then the utilitarian 
decision-maker is indifferent: 
 
(18) 𝑉ghij(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) = 	𝑉ghij(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
 
A decision-maker who is sensitive to the inter-personal prospect distribution objects to the 
fact that Protecting 99 Sheep imposes a wider spread of expectations on the sheep.  
 
(19) 𝑉,GHGG	/	y	z	{(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) < 	𝑉,GHGG	/	y	z	{(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
 
A decision-maker who is sensitive to the inter-state distribution objects to the fact that Saving 
One Sheep leaves a wider spread between the average state utilities: Things may just go 
horribly wrong in Saving One Sheep.  
 
(20) 𝑉]aGb	/	y	z	{	(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔) > 	𝑉]aGb	/	y	z	{(𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔)	 
 
There is an intuitive story to be told here. On the one hand, we may be especially sensitive to 
the fact that some individuals have very low expectations. In this case we don’t want to just 
give up on the sheep on row 100. Sensitivity to the inter-personal prospect distribution makes 
us more eager to save the few than a utilitarian decision-maker. On the other hand, we may 
particularly care about the possibility that things could just go horribly wrong for the 
collective. In this case, we should be prepared to give up on row 100 in order to avoid the 
possibility of a grand downfall for all. Sensitivity to the inter-state distribution makes us more 
eager to reduce the risk to the many than a utilitarian decision-maker.  
 
So, in the case of correlated risk, the relevant sensitivities pull in opposite directions from the 
utilitarian ranking.  
 
 
 
6 Critics 
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Each of these sensitivities has had its detractors over the years and debates in the literature 
about making risky decisions for others can be captured in terms of how much weight these 
sensitivities should receive in particular situations.  
 
 
6.1 Against Inter-Personal Prospect Distribution Sensitivity  
 
Here is a variant of a case presented by Reibetanz 1998. Suppose that 100 farmers will be 
ploughing a field. There is a bomb in the field and one is bound to blow themselves up in 
doing so. A uniquely qualified bomb expert can detonate the bomb safely but in so doing will 
incur pneumonia. We are comparing the following distributions. Utility 1 stands for full 
health, 0 stands for death, and .9 for incurring pneumonia.   
 
 
 
1 1 1 1 
 1 1 1 
…  … … … 
1 1 1 1 
.9 .9 .9 .9 
Average 
Expectation: 
100.9/101 
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.99 0 … 1 1 
     
…  … … … … 
.99 1 … 1 0 
1 1 … 1 1 
Average 
Expectation: 
100/101 
    
 
Safe Detonation   Lethal Bomb 
 
Table 11. Safe Detonation and Lethal Bomb 
 
Safe Detonation, which has the greater utilitarian value, indeed seems to be the morally 
preferable option. However, if we are sufficiently sensitive to the inter-personal prospect-
Distribution, that is for a sufficiently high ∝CDCC , then the value of Lethal Bomb exceeds the 
value of Safe Detonation.  
 
In this particular case, there are indeed various features that would make one hesitant about 
supporting the solution that is sensitive to the inter-personal prospect distribution:  
 
(i) The harm to the expert (pneumonia) is substantially smaller than the harm that 
is bound to befall one of the farmers (death).  
(ii) The risks are anti-correlated and the harm is sure to occur (unlike for 
independent risk).  
(iii) We are making a recommendation about what the expert should do, not about 
the policy that a decision-maker should implement affecting others.  
 
Suppose that the expert is bound to lose a limb in carrying out their task, with the utility of 
this health state set at .50 (Harmful Detonation), or that they run a .50 chance of losing their 
lives (Risky Detonation). Suppose that the risks to the farmers are independent so that there 
is a small chance that nobody will be affected. Let us call this Lethal Bomb*. And suppose that 
we are a decision-maker who needs to instruct the expert what to do. In this case, the 
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utilitarian calculus would still recommend Harmful Detonation and Risky Detonation over 
Lethal Bomb*, since its average expectation equals 100.5/101 > 100/101. But now, I submit, 
we would be much less comfortable following this recommendation.  
 
 
6.2 Against Inter-State Distribution Sensitivity  
 
Keeney 1980 studies prospects with binary utilities—say, either the people in the prospect 
will live or they will die. He shows that there is a conflict between the goal of risk equity, i.e. 
the goal of distributing risk equally between individuals, and the goal of catastrophe 
avoidance, i.e. minimizing the risk that a large number of individuals will be hit. Indeed, the 
best way to avoid a catastrophe is to concentrate the risk on a few individuals, but this 
sacrifice of a small group is anti-egalitarian.  
 
Consider a case of independent risk. Compare the following two prospects with binary 
utilities. Suppose that one person is bound to die and the other is bound to live. Call this 
prospect One Lives One Dies. We can spread the risk so that each has an independent chance 
of dying of .50. Call this prospect Coin Flip. The certainty equivalent of the state averages of 
One Lives One Dies is .50. But for 𝛽_C`  > 0, the certainty equivalent of the state averages of 
Coin Flip is lower than .50. Hence, a decision-maker who is sensitive to the inter-state 
distribution will try to focus the risk on a single person at the cost of risk equity.  
 
 
EU  
0 0 0 
1 1 1 
SA 1/2 1/2 
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EU  
½ 0 1 0 1 
½  0 0 1 1 
SA 0 1/2 1/2 1 
 
One Lives One Dies   Coin Flip 
 
Table 12. One Lives One Dies and Coin Flip  
 
The same tension holds for correlated risk. Let us revisit the story of the Lost Sheep. The inter-
state distribution sensitivity favours Protecting 99 Sheep over Saving One Sheep. Protecting 
99 Sheep offloads the risk on one sheep, viz. the lost sheep that won’t be saved. Risk equity 
is embodied in the inter-personal prospect distribution sensitivity which, as we saw, favours 
Saving One Sheep, since it spreads the risk from the lost sheep to the 99 sheep in the barn.  
 
 
6.3 Against Intra-State Distribution Sensitivity  
 
Adler 2012: 523–4 argues that a decision-maker who is sensitive to the intra-state distribution 
does not satisfy the Axiom of Weak Separability of Persons.  
 
What does the axiom say? Take two prospects A and B with persons 1, …, n. First, construct 
prospects A* and B* by adding a person who is completely unaffected: Whatever states 
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materialises, they receive a fixed utility u*.  Second, construct prospects A# and B# by adding 
a person who is also completely unaffected: Whatever state materialises, they receive a fixed 
utility u#. Certainly, the axiom says, whether we add one person with a certain prospect of u* 
or another person with a certain prospect of u# should not make a difference to the ranking 
of the prospects.  
 
This axiom is violated if we calculate the value of prospects by means of  ∝CDC> 0.	Consider 
the prospects in Table 13. Set ∝CDC  at ½. Start with the one-person prospects A and B; add 
one person with certain utility u* = 0; and one person with certain utility u# = .49. Note how 
A* ≻,GHG/*/B B* but B# ≻,GHG/*/B A#, in violation of the Axiom of Weak Separability of 
Persons.  
 
 
 
S1 S2 
P1 0 1 
 
 
S1 S2 
P1 .49 .49 
 
A B 
 
 
S1 S2 
P1 0 1 
P2 0 0 
 𝑉,GHG	/*/B	(A∗) = 1/8 = .1250 
 
 
 ≻,GHG/*/B 
 
 
 
 
S1 S2 
P1 .49 .49  
P2 0 0 
 𝑉,GHG	/*/B	(B∗) =.1225 
 
 
 
S1 S2 
P1 0 1 
P2 .49 .49 
 𝑉,GHG	/*/B	(A#) = .4225 
 
 
 ≺,GHG/*/B 
 
 
 
S1 S2 
P1 .49 .49 
P2 .49 .49 
 𝑉,GHG	/*/B	(B#) = .49  
 
 
Table 13. Adler’s Objection   
 
How problematic is this? The axiom seems attractive because we confuse being unaffected 
with being uninvolved in the project. Indeed, it would be problematic if an uninvolved person 
could just be tagged onto the prospect and the ordering would flip depending on whether we 
tag on an uninvolved homeless person or an uninvolved millionaire. Uninvolved people 
should not be included. However, the fact that one is unaffected by a given policy decision 
does not mean that one is uninvolved. Involvement is determined by one’s place in the social 
world. A choice between remuneration policies in the company where I am employed may 
not affect me in that it does not make a difference to my income. However, I am involved on 
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grounds of being an employee of the company and the choice between prospects should 
feature me.  
 
Whether an unaffected person involved in a prospect is richer or poorer does make a 
difference to the intra-state distribution. We posit a decision-maker who is sensitive to the 
intra-state distribution. In the choice between A and B this sensitivity does not enter in, since 
these are one-person prospects. The decision-maker prefers A to B, since it offers a higher 
expectation. Adding a poor person to the prospect does not make B* more attractive to the 
decision-maker and they continue to prefer A*. Adding a person with the same utility as the 
person in B introduces equality into B#, which makes it into a more attractive option than A# 
to our decision-maker.8   
 
 
6.4 Against the Intra-Personal Prospect Distribution  
 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2018, elaborating on an argument proposed earlier in Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve 2009, construct the following case, modelled on Nagel 1979. There is a fifty-fifty 
chance that your child will turn out to be disabled or not. If they are disabled, then they will 
be slightly better off in town than in the country. If they are healthy, then they will be much 
better off in the country than in town. Should you move to town or to the country? We set 
the utilities as follows:  
 
Disabled living in the 
Country  
Disabled living in 
Town  
Healthy living in 
Town 
Healthy living in the 
Country 
0 .10  .80  1  
 
Table 14. Utilities in Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s Example  
 
A single child, if idealized to be rational and well-informed, would choose to move to the 
country since it yields greater expected welfare. The question is whether a decision-maker 
choosing for the child could overrule this choice. Otsuka and Voorhoeve believe that a 
decision-maker should opt for the prospect that maximises the child’s expected welfare. If 
there are two children in the prospect facing fully correlated risks, then the same holds. But 
if they are facing fully anti-correlated risk, then we should choose for Town. See the rankings 
for O&V in Table 15. 
 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve are sensitive to the intra-state distribution. They favour Town in the 
case of anti-correlated risk because the health inequalities within each state are less 
pronounced than in Country.  However, they are not sensitive to the intra-personal prospect 
distribution. We can only overrule the choice of the persons in the prospects on grounds of 
intra-state inequalities.  
 
Parfit 2012 disagrees. He argues that the parents should choose Town in each case. His 
argument is prioritarian: It is better to procure the smaller benefit of .1 – 0 = .1 by being 
located in town for a child that turns out to be disabled than the larger benefit of 1 – .8 = .2 
                                               
8 See also Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey 2016: 943–4.  
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by being located in the country for a child that turns out to be healthy. He objects to Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve that whether risks are correlated or anti-correlated cannot possibly make a 
difference to the moral ranking over the prospects. The fact that my interests matter more 
when I am disabled is morally significant as such and not because I am poorly off relative to 
someone else being better off.  
 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve disagree. In the case of anti-correlation, one sibling will turn out 
healthy and one sibling will turn out disabled. Then by moving to the country, we know that 
a situation will ensue in which the disabled sibling can make the following forceful complaint: 
“Dear Parents, I have a reasonable complaint about your moving us to the country. It was a 
benefit to my sibling, but a harm to me, and even though the harm to me is smaller than the 
benefit to my sibling, you should have given priority to whoever would turn out to be worse 
off.” The same cannot be said in the case of correlated risk.  
 
That is true, but something very similar can be said by the siblings if they both end up being 
disabled. They may complain: “Dear Parents, we have a reasonable complaint about your 
moving us to the country. It is a harm to us. Granted, the harm is smaller than the benefit that 
it would have offered us had we been healthy. However, you should have given more weight 
in your decision-making to the harm in case we would turn out to be disabled than the benefit 
in case we would turn out to be healthy.” Why would this counterfactual comparison with 
counterpart siblings in the case of correlated risk provide any less of a forceful complaint than 
the actual comparison between siblings in the case of anti-correlated risk?  
 
I argued earlier that it is perfectly acceptable for a decision-maker who is sensitive to the 
intra-personal prospect distribution to add some risk aversion to the risk attitudes of the 
persons in the prospect. The parents of our siblings may argue that the risk of moving to the 
country is a risk that they cannot take for others—they can’t have the child end up disabled 
in the country on their watch. Sensitivity to the intra-personal prospect distribution can justify 
a choice or Town over Country in each of the three cases of Table 15. Hence, in this case, 
sensitivity to the intra-personal prospect distribution could support the same rankings as 
Parfit’s prioritarian argument.  
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Disabled   Healthy  
0 1 
1 0 
 
Town    Country  
 
 
Table 15. Otsuka and Voorhoeve’s Objection to Prioritarianism  
 
 
 
7.  Discussion  
 
 
We have discussed four distributional sensitivities that may, in certain decision situations, 
upset the utilitarian ordering. Multiple sensitivities can enter in at the same time and either 
reinforce each other or pull in opposite directions. In Bovens 2015a and 2015b, I proposed a 
model that integrates these sensitivities.  
 
It is a mistake to think that there is a single model that will tell us once and for all how we 
should resolve dilemmas of risky decision-making for others. The information that is 
contained in prospects is too impoverished to determine a unique ranking. To determine a 
moral ranking over risky prospects affecting others we need to have access to much more 
detail than matrices of utilities with persons in the rows, states in columns and probability 
distributions over states.  
 
The situation is comparable to Sen’s 1970, 1976 and Gibbard’s 1974 discussion of the 
Libertarian Paradox. In Sen’s version of the paradox, Prude and Lewd find a copy of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover in the book store. Lewd thinks it would be a shame for the book to remain 
unread. She would like to read it herself. But she prefers that Prude read it, because it would 
do him some good. Prude would rather have it that nobody read the book. But if someone is 
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going to read it, then it better be him, because heaven knows what it might do to Lewd. Table 
16 contains the preference orderings.  
 
Prude Lewd 
0 P 
P  L 
L  0 
 
Table 16. Sen’s Libertarian Paradox  
 
Who, if anyone, should walk out with the book? Again, we have a dilemma. The Principle of 
Minimal Libertarianism says that one should be decisive about at least some options in one’s 
private sphere, such as, whether to read or not to read a particular book. Prude and Lewd 
should each be decisive as to whether they will or will not read the book. Hence, L ≻ 0 and 0 ≻ P and so, by Minimal Libertarianism, we should hand the book to Lewd. But note that both 
Lewd and Prude prefer P ≻ L. So, by the Pareto Principle, we should hand the book to Prude. 
What should we do?  
 
Gibbard presents a version of Gilbert and Sullivan’s Trial by Jury that has a similar structure. 
It is not quite respectful of modern sensitivities, but as a comedy and a critique of mores, it 
still passes muster. Edwin would rather not marry Angelina, but if she is going to marry the 
Judge, then he would rather marry her than see her marry the Judge. Angelina would rather 
marry Edwin than the Judge, but she prefers marrying the Judge to not marrying anyone.  
 
Edwin Angelina 
0 E 
E J 
J 0 
 
Table 17. Gibbard’s version of the Libertarian Paradox  
 
Who, if anyone, should get married to whom? Minimal Libertarianism stipulates the 
following. If the Judge is a willing party, then it is in Angelina’s private sphere whether to 
marry him or not. If Angelina is a willing party, then it is in Edwin’s private sphere whether to 
marry her or not. So, J ≻ 0 and 0 ≻ E. By Minimal Libertarianism, we recommend that the 
Judge marry Angelina. However, both Edwin and Angelina prefer to be married to each other 
than for Angelina to be married to the Judge. Hence, by Pareto, E ≻ J. What should be our 
recommendation?  
 
In Sen’s version, there is something to be said for discounting nosy preferences and respecting 
each person’s desire to read or not read. At least, this is how Sen sees the case. Hence, 
Minimal Libertarianism wins and the book goes to Lewd. In Gibbard’s version, there is 
something to be said for letting the parties express their preferences. Angelina can threaten 
Edwin to marry the Judge, and Edwin will come to realise that he can only avoid this outcome 
by marrying Angelina. Hence, Pareto wins and Angelina and Edwin will tie the knot. At least, 
this is how Gibbard sees the case.  
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In Sen’s response to Gibbard, he concedes that there is no single solution to the Libertarian 
Paradox. To resolve the dilemma in a morally sensitive matter, we need much more 
information than the information that is contained in the preference profile. The preference 
profile is too informationally impoverished to determine whether Pareto or Minimal 
Libertarianism should have the overhand.  
 
Similarly, prospects alone are too informationally impoverished to determine a unique 
ordering. Different distributional sensitivities are fitting in different contexts. And just as in 
Sen’s and Gibbard’s Libertarian Paradoxes, different dilemmas may be represented by the 
same prospects and yet demand very different solutions.  
 
Here is an example of very different types of decisions that can be modelled by the same pair 
of prospects. Let us revisit the case of screening for breast cancer which we modelled in Table 
6. Public health dilemmas over alcohol policy can be modelled by the same pair of prospects. 
There are various things one can do to reduce alcohol consumption—increased taxes, 
restrictions on deep discounting (that is, a sale price below VAT and excise taxes), minimal 
unit pricing, limiting sales times etc. Many people object to restrictive alcohol policies. 
However, when we consider the number of alcohol-related deaths prevented in the 
population at large by restrictive policies, one might think that this annoyance is a small price 
to pay for the benefits gained. The stylised prospects for No Screening and Screening could 
also serve as models for respectively a liberal alcohol policy and a restrictive alcohol policy.  
 
A decision-maker with a sensitivity for the intra-state distribution might defend a policy of 
intensive screening for breast cancer, overruling the preferences of a majority of the women 
involved. We know that it is highly likely that many more women would die with less intensive 
screening and from a public health standpoint saving these women through intensive 
screening is worth the annoyance and unnecessary treatment. I have some sympathy for this 
position. However, in the case of alcohol policy, I am less sympathetic to restrictive alcohol 
policies. Certainly, we can save many lives by introducing more restrictive alcohol policies, 
and yet, I am less inclined to overrule the preferences of a population that resists such moves. 
In England, suggestions of more restrictive alcohol policies are met with the defiant response: 
“We do not want to become Sweden.”  
 
So even though the pair of prospects that model both public health dilemmas are the same, I 
am more inclined to let the Pareto condition be overruled in the case of breast cancer 
screening than in the case of alcohol policies. What makes for the difference? In the case of 
breast cancer screening who will and will not be affected by breast cancer is down to brute 
luck. But in the case of alcohol policies, who will and will not be affected by alcohol-related 
morbidity is to a certain extent down to the choices that people make. For this reason, I am 
less willing to overrule the preference of many currently responsible drinkers who want to 
continue enjoying their pint English-style. This distinction is not reflected in prospects: All we 
have is a probability distribution over better or worse consequences that may come about 
under different screening regimes or different alcohol policies. Just as in the Sen-Gibbard 
debate, there is information that is extraneous to the formal model, viz. whether people have 
more or less control over health outcomes, that determines how much weight conflicting 
reasons merit in resolving the dilemma.  
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What is the good of modelling, if not to determine a single decision algorithm ideally backed 
up by an axiomatic justification? What progress did we make by modelling these multiple 
sensitivities? Making risky decisions for others in a morally responsible matter is not an 
algorithmic exercise and the formal machinery is not meant to make it such. However, formal 
machinery helps us understand what forces are at work when we find ourselves in a quandary 
and what is driving people when they disagree in the forum. This is an important contribution 
to moral decision-making. It is a mistake to expect more definite answers from modelling.9  
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